Memorandum  from Maurice Ostroff

To the President’s Commission for examination of the structure of the government in Israel                                                               June 9, 2006

 

 

 

Introduction

At the meeting of the commission at the Dan Panorama Hotel on February 27, 2006, a visiting speaker from the USA gave valuable advice:  He said “If it doesn’t itch – don’t scratch”, a variant of an earlier American maxim “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it.” It is relevant to recall that CECI director Adi Sterenberg, recently wrote that that the Israeli political system is indeed broken, and needs to be urgently fixed.

 

I quote this bit of advice because it is a Herculean task to select a comprehensive solution from the many very interesting and even erudite proposals for electoral reform offered at the meeting at Tel Aviv University on June 7.

 

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The Electoral System

As we know from the disastrous consequences of the change to the direct election of the PM, this apparently advantageous theory resulted in undesirable consequences in practice. The experience should teach us to be cautious in effecting more changes than necessary; no matter how attractive they may appear to be in theory.

 

There is no purpose in my analyzing in detail the several electoral systems currently available as these have been described in the excellent papers already presented. To keep this paper short, I will make no effort to describe in detail, the voting system I consider ideal. I will rather confine myself to comments on features, which I consider desirable, and those, which must be avoided, in evaluating the various systems, which are being proposed.

 

The main objectives of a democratic electoral system are:

·         to ensure equality for every vote cast

·         to ensure stable government

·         to permit representation of diverse points of view

·         to allow citizens to vote for their preferred candidates without risking wasted votes. 

·         to ensure the accountability of individual MKs to their electorates.

 

The prudent approach is to concentrate on where it itches by clearly defining the defects in our present system, which prevent the achievement of the above objectives.

 

After determining the existing defects, we can proceed logically to investigate how best to deal with them. I therefore list some of the immediate problems that stand in the way of good and efficient government.

 

1. MK’s have no direct responsibility to the people who elect them

Because voters have no influence on the individual MKs appointed by the parties, MKs have no need to demonstrate an interest in any particular group of voters in order to be re-elected. Moreover, voters have no access to an MK who will take an interest in their special concerns. This vexed problem has generated many “quick fix” solutions based on regional constituencies, as in Britain and the USA.

 

FPTP and Regional Constituencies

Proponents of the British and American constituency or regional district system, refer to the advantage that every citizen can appeal to the MP or Congressman or woman representing his or her district. However, counterbalancing this important advantage are serious disadvantages, which have led to moves in Britain and the USA, towards a change to Proportional Representation (PR).

 

The most popular and least complicated method in this system is known as "First Past the Post" (FPTP), or “winner-takes-all”. One candidate runs for each party in a given regional district and the candidate receiving the most votes wins the seat.

 

The major disadvantages are:

• if there are more than two parties standing in a constituency, the winner does not represent the majority of the voters. For example if four parties are standing. A gains 20%, B 30%, C 35% and D 15%. C wins the seat and the views of 65% of the voters are ignored, a distinctly undemocratic situation which we should avoid. In Britain for example, Labor won the 2005 election with only 36 percent, of the popular vote.

·         The much-vaunted ability of a voter to appeal to the MK for his/her district is generally limited to mundane matters concerning the particular district. An MK is however, unlikely to respond positively in matters which diverge from his/her political orientation, even though 65% of the voters, as in the abovementioned case for example, may feel strongly about the subject.
This would not occur in a PR system with “open lists”

• In “safe seat” areas with a high proportion of voters favoring a particular party, voter turnout is invariably low. Opponents feel it is not worth voting and supporters feel that their party will win without their support
• Similarly in a safe seat district, those voters who disagree with the politics of the party which regularly wins are effectively disenfranchised. Their votes do not count. This does not occur in a nationwide PR system..
• Determination of the boundaries of districts is a complex task that can lead to serious disputes and possible deadlock. In the USA the term Gerrymandering[i] is used to describe the manipulation of district borders to gain an electoral advantage. Interestingly, among western democracies, only Israel and the Netherlands are not susceptible to gerrymandering as each has only one nationwide voting district.

 

PR with Open and Closed Lists

While Proportional Representation is theoretically the most democratic, Israel’s particular format is defective in that we are the only Western country still relying on "closed lists". As earlier asserted, these distort the democratic intention of PR.

 

Although the Labor Party’s list is closed to the voting public, it is more democratic than the other parties in that all party members may vote for the list in primary elections. However, even this process  is subject to abuse.  Interviewed on English Radio on December 4, Colette Avital spoke of a "hit list" being prepared by the party bosses, which would prevent her from receiving an equal chance of being selected by the voters in the election, highlighting the fundamental problem of "Closed Lists".

 

The “Closed List” prevents voter from denying a vote to a person considered unworthy, especially to persons on the list who may be associated with corruption or scandal, thus permitting corrupt and criminal elements to seep into government.

 

In essence, because the voters do not personally elect them, MKs ignore public opinion with impunity, raising the question of whether they owe allegiance to their parties, party bosses or the electorate.

 

PR with "Open Lists"

Proportional representation is the choice of most European countries, but unlike in Israel, they also give their voters a say in the choice of individual candidates by using "Open Lists".  In addition to voting for a party the voter chooses among the candidates proposed by the party. This gives voters some influence over the selection of candidates and the sequence of their standing. It gives candidates a reciprocal, serious interest in winning the support of ordinary voters, an interest which is sadly lacking in the “Closed Lists” system.

 

The order of priority of the candidates is decided in some systems by the voters; in others by a combination of voter and party's choices.

 

In the most open of  “Open List” systems, as in Finland, voters are presented with random lists of candidates chosen by the several parties. Instead of voting directly for a party he or she votes for an individual candidate; this vote is then attributed to the candidate's party as well as the candidate.

 

Mixed PR and Constituencies

Suggestions have been made for a combination of PR and constituencies. However, there is an important lesson to be learned from the recent PA elections, which used this combined system resulting in the Hamas victory.

 

It is not commonly realized that on the national (PR) list, 56.06% of the voters did not vote for Hamas, which won its large majority of seats with only 43.94% of the vote.  The results are even more revealing on the constituency or district lists.

 

According to Gershon Baskin, Hamas candidates received only 36.45% of the votes with non-Hamas candidates receiving a massive 63.54% of the votes. The reason - Hamas presented a unified list in each district while Fatah and others had a multiplicity of candidates. 

 

2 .Impediments to stable government (raising the threshold)

One of the problems inherent in PR systems is a tendency to attract a large number of small parties. It is an unfortunate fact of life that small parties are prone to demand inducements (some would call them bribes) to support the inevitably fragile coalitions.

 

The number of competing parties in turn, is influenced by the minimum number of votes required for a party to be eligible for representation in the Knesset. Raising this threshold would be a simple yet effective reform of immediate benefit.

 

Until the 13th Knesset, the qualifying threshold was only 1%. Increased to 1.5% in the early 1990s there were, nevertheless 28 parties standing in the January 2003 Knesset elections. Of these, only 13 obtained seats. 128,740 votes were wasted, achieving no seats at all. Increasing the threshold to say 5%, as in Germany, would not only contribute to more stable governments by reducing the number of small parties, it would also prevent small extreme fringe groups from entering the Knesset.

 

Improving the quality of government

1. Trim the bloated cabinet and save millions

In Japan with a population over 127 million, the number of Ministers is basically not more than 14, but may be increased to a maximum of 17 in case of “special need”.  Considering further that Britain has 20 cabinet ministers and President Bush manages with a cabinet of 18, the 28 Israeli cabinet ministers does appear excessive to say the least.

 

The entire democratic process becomes distorted by the prevalence of ministers appointed as rewards for support, creating the appalling phenomenon that votes in the cabinet and Knesset, are cast in payment of obligations, not merit. Worse still, some ministers are chosen for promising to vote correctly, rather than on their qualifications for the job.

 

The Law originally provided for a maximum of 18 and minimum of 10 cabinet ministers. Considering that each minister is provided with an expensive car, several assistants, a driver, a bureau chief, one or two aides, a spokesman, a secretary, comprehensive pension and medical insurance, offices in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, a residence in Jerusalem, travel, hotels, and food on official business and other perks, billions of shekels would have been saved over the past few years if only 10 to 18 cabinet ministers had been appointed.

 

Rationalization can be achieved painlessly. Yossi Beilin deserves congratulations for having done away with his own economic planning ministry. Other serious suggestions have been made to disband the Ministry of Science; to merge the Ministry for Internal Security with the Interior Ministry; Tourism with Trade and Industry; and for distributing sections of the Religious Affairs Ministry among the Interior, Education and Justice Ministries.

2. Change the immunity of Knesset members law.

There is some rationale for granting immunity to MKs’ in respect of risks they may take in connection with parliamentary duties, but there is no reason whatsoever for an MK to be free to commit driving offences with impunity.  That the immunity provision is seriously abused was vividly demonstrated when a Knesset member prevented police from searching her father’s house. If we are serious about improving the quality of government the Knesset immunity law must be drastically changed.

 

3. Cut wasteful government expenditure

With the constant cry about lack of funds for humanitarian needs such as the medical basket, it is inequitable to continue extravagant unnecessary spending. Many opportunities are available to cut excess fat, such as suspending the NIS 200m Knesset's new wing, scheduled to open in January 2007; reducing extravagant travel such as MK Gamliel’s seven overseas trips in less than a year and curbing the astronomical salaries paid by Bank of Israel.

4. Establish an external body to regulate salaries and perks payable to MKs.

It is inequitable for MK’s to determine their own salaries and perks. Legislation is required to ensure that the salaries, not only of MK’s but also their assistants, are determined by an outside impartial body. This should prevent the type of miscarriage of justice that occurred in January 2005, when, even while the budget was being savagely slashed and welfare support reduced, Knesset members increased the salaries of 200 aides at a cost of NIS 10 million a year.

 

5. Legislate to regulate strikes, which affect public services.

The public has a short memory. We appear to have forgotten the misery and high cost of the paralyzing strikes we experienced over the past few years.

 

If we are prepared to learn from others, the solution is compulsory mediation, followed if necessary by binding arbitration. Before any strike may be called, union members must be compelled to vote. In some countries, even before such a vote can take place the parties must try to mediate and a grace period must be respected to consider any recommendations made by a mediator. If mediation fails the next compulsory step must be arbitration as provided for in the labor laws of many countries.

 

The concept is not unfamiliar in Israel. Over the years the Knesset has considered, but rejected, several compulsory arbitration bills.

 

In South Korea any form of industrial action affecting essential services may not take place without the completion of "adjustment procedures" such as mediation and arbitration. In Norway during a nursing strike, the health authorities considered a potential threat to national health intolerable, and the government promptly passed compulsory arbitration legislation to end the strike. It ended immediately.

 

In 1993 president Bill Clinton ended an American Airlines strike when the airline and striking flight attendants agreed to Clinton's intervention and a call for binding arbitration, thereby saving the jobs of 4,000 flight attendants.